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Chapter one 
1.1 Introduction: Surrogacy 
The development of assisted reproductive technology (ART)1 has radically changed the 
landscape of the conventional family.2 It has permitted a platform for the creation of 
families and family structures with tremendous diversity in their demographic 
characteristics.3 It has also changed the way in which individuals become parents. 4 The 
advances in medical and scientific fertility treatments have meant that for many the dream 
of having a child of their own has now become a real possibility.5 Public perception and 
attitudes towards infertility treatments and more latterly surrogacy has changed 
tremendously and becoming increasingly acceptable.6 While there are those who have 
celebrated the advancement in reproductive technologies and potential freedoms that this 
may contain, ART has opened the proverbial Pandora’s Box amongst scholars and the public 
policy makers, principally in the area of rights.7 
 ‘Surrogacy, a form of ART, occurs where one woman bears a child for another.’8 It may be 
total (gestational), where the surrogate is not biologically related to the child or partial, 
where the gamete of the surrogate is used.9 Another form of surrogacy is commercial 
surrogacy, which occurs when more financial compensation is given to the surrogate than 
her actual expenses.10 However, my research paper will not be dealing with commercial 
surrogacy and it will only be referred to where relevant.  
 
                                                          
1
 Assisted Reproductive Technology (hereafter ART) - the treatment for infertility. 
2
 Sabatello M ‘Are the kids alright? A child centred approach to assisted reproductive technologies’ (2013) 31 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 74. 
3
 Sabatello M (2013) 75. 
4
 Sabatello M (2013) 75.  
5
 Connolly B ‘Surrogacy from an English perspective (but increasingly a global issue)’ 2012 para 1.3 available at 
(www.millerdutoitcloeteinc.co.za/family-law-cape-town-img/Conf2012/Conf2012/Paper%20-
%20B%20Connolly%20-%202.pdf) accessed 02 September 2016. 
6
 Connolly B (2012) para 1.4. 
7
 Sabatello M (2013) 75. 
8
 Nicholson C ‘When moral outrage determines a legal response: Surrogacy as Labour’ (2013) 29 SAJHR 497. 
9
 Nicholson C (2013) 497. 
10
 Nicholson C (2013) 497. 
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Surrogacy has often been presented as a treatment for infertility, a way to obtain medical 
assistance in the process of reproduction.11 Surrogacy arrangements are sometimes 
concluded within families and on an informal basis; this generally escapes the attention of 
the courts, unless a dispute arises between the parties involved.12 A contrasting view of 
surrogacy other than a reproductive phenomenon has also caused much controversy in 
which it has been characterised as exploitative and compared to baby selling.13 This 
opposition to surrogacy, which exists, is mostly moralistic in nature and directed towards 
the perceived immoral and degrading practice of commercial surrogacy.14 
  
This research paper will look at the right of a child born through the services of ART but 
more specifically surrogacy, to identity. This paper will show that in order for the child’s best 
interest to be considered as primary or paramount in surrogacy, there has to be an 
acknowledgement that a child has a legal right to know her biological origins.15 
 
 Before the enactment of chapter 19 of the Children’s Act,16 surrogacy was not expressly 
regulated in South Africa by any legislation. The Children’s Status Act17, which prevailed at 
the time, did not expressly regulate surrogacy. There were also no pre-constitutional 
judgments where parties approached our courts in an attempt to enforce a surrogacy 
contract.18   In the year 1992, the South African Law Commission (SALC) had concluded that 
the ‘practical application of existing legislation [The Children’s Status Act] leaves much to be 
desired’ as it ‘does not provide adequate protection for the parties involved’.19  
 
In the same year, the SALC sought to fill this legislative lacuna. The SALC drafted the 
Surrogacy Bill and recommended that Parliament adopt it as an Act. However, the Bill was 
                                                          
11
 European Centre for Law and Justice Surrogate Motherhood: A Violation of Human Rights (2012)3 available 
at icolf.org/surrogate-motherhood-a-violation-of-human-rights/ (accessed 10 October 2017). 
12
 Nicholson C (2013) 498. 
13
 European Centre for Law and Justice (2012)6. 
14
 Nicholson C (2013) 499. 
15
 South African Law Reform Issue Paper 32 (Project 140) The Right to Know One’s Own Biological Origins 
(2017) available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ipapers.htm (accessed 10 October 2017). 
16
 The Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (hereinafter the Children’s Act). 
17
 Children’s Status Act 82 of 1987. 
18
 AB and Another v Minister of Social Development 2017 (3) SA 570 (CC) para 34. 
19
 South African Law Commission (Project 65) Report on Surrogate Motherhood ( 1992) para 4.6.3 
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never passed due to the criticism lodged against the Bill.20 The Legislature then set up an Ad 
hoc Select Committee (Ad hoc Committee) to make recommendations regarding the 
proposal of the SALC. The Ad hoc Committee subsequently compiled its own report21 and 
based on this, the legislature enacted chapter 19 of the Children’s Act, which presently 
regulates surrogacy in our law.22 
 
The Children’s Act defines a surrogate motherhood agreement as:  
 
‘An agreement between a surrogate mother and a commissioning parent in which it is 
agreed that the surrogate mother will be artificially fertilised for the purpose of bearing a 
child for the commissioning parent and in which the surrogate mother undertakes to hand 
over such a child to the commissioning parent upon its birth, or within a reasonable time 
thereafter, with the intention that the child concerned becomes the legitimate child of the 
commissioning parent.’23 
 
This definition makes it apparent that the type of surrogacy referred to involves artificial 
fertilisation24 and that stems from the development of modern reproductive technologies,  
particularly Invitro Fertilisation (IVF). The development of IVF technology is believed to have 
paved the way for modern surrogacy arrangements; it forms part of the artificial fertilisation  
process referred to in the Children’s Act.25  
 
                                                          
20
 Parliamentary Committee Report of the AD Hoc Committee on Report of South African Law Commission on 
Surrogate Motherhood (11 February 1999) available at www.assets-s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/docs/990211slrcreport.doc. (Hereafter the AD Hoc Report). 
21
 Parliamentary Committee Report of the AD Hoc Committee on Report of South African Law Commission on 
Surrogate Motherhood (11 February 1999) available at www.assets-s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/docs/990211slrcreport.doc. (Hereafter the AD Hoc Report). 
22
 Note that not all recommendations were incorporated into the Children’s Act. See recommendations of the 
Ad Hoc Report: That a statutory body should be constituted to operate as the panel to screen parties wishing 
to enter into a surrogacy agreement. That a child over the age of ten should be informed of their genetic back 
ground. Further that a guardian ad litem be appointed for the child in partial surrogacy cases. These 
recommendations were never incorporated into the chapter dealing with surrogacy in the Children’s Act. 
 
23
 Section 1 of the Children’s Act. 
24
 AB (2017) para 37. 
25
 AB (2017) para 37. 
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 Chapter 19, spanning sections 292 to 303 of the Children’s Act, delineates the procedural 
and substantive boundaries of surrogate motherhood agreements. The section this research 
paper will focus on is section 294 of the Children’s Act, which states: 
 
‘No surrogate motherhood agreement is valid unless the conception of the child 
contemplated in the agreement is to be effected by the use of the gametes of both 
commissioning parents or, if that is not possible due to biological, medical or other valid 
reasons, the gamete of at least one of the commissioning parents or, where the 
commissioning parent is a single person, the gamete of that person’.26 
 
In 2016, the SALRC embarked on an investigation into the right of a child to know her own 
biological origins.27 One of the reasons for this investigation cited by the SALRC is due to the 
recent judgment of AB v Minister of Social Development and Others.28 Section 294 of the 
Children’s Act came under constitutional scrutiny and the court ultimately concluded that 
more clarity is needed regarding the origins of donor-conceived children, as this clarity is 
important to the ‘self- identity’ and ‘self- respect’ of the child.29 By doing so, the Justices 
recognised that the right of a child to know her biological origins is important to that child’s 
identity formation. 
 
Given the recent judgment of the AB case, it is timely to consider the implications of the 
judgment within the context of the child’s right to identity. Furthermore based on the 
judgment, it is also timely to consider the scope of the child’s identity rights and the 
acknowledgment that the child has a legal right to know her biological origins. In order to 
determine the scope and content of this legal right of a child to know her biological origins, 
one has to ascertain firstly what is identity, how can it be protected and why it is in the best 
interest of the child to preserve this right. 
 
                                                          
26
 Section 294 of the Children’s Act. 
27
 South African Law Reform Issue Paper 32 (Project 140) The Right to Know One’s Own Biological Origins 
(2017) available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ipapers.htm. 
28
 AB and Another v Minister of Social Development 2017 (3) SA 570 (CC). 
29
 AB (2017) para 288. See also SALRC Issue Paper 32. 
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The current legal position in South Africa allows anonymous gamete donation as well as 
protection of the identity of a surrogate.30 Furthermore, it is an offence to reveal the 
identity of a gamete donor as well as the surrogate.31 This is in direct contrast to the 
judgment of the AB case. 
 
1.2 Research problem 
As mentioned above the AB case concluded that the child’s right to identity i.e. the 
biological origins should be protected because it is in the best interest of the child. The 
research question this paper aims to determine is the scope and content of the child’s right 
to identity in the context of surrogacy. To achieve this, one needs to look at the right of a 
child to know her origins, which is a right greatly impacted by the process of surrogacy. 
Furthermore, one needs to analyse what the right to know one’s biological origins entails. 
The concept of knowing your biological origins is a difficult issue to understand and can have 
a different meaning for different people.32 The right to know one’s biological origins can 
therefore cover a variety of concepts, which consists of at least three specific aspects.33  
 
 ‘[T]he medical aspect, i.e. the right to know one’s full family medical history and to 
know medically relevant genetic information about the donor;  
 
 the identity aspect, i.e. the right to personal narrative information about the donor 
that could assist offspring in completing the picture of their own identity; and  
 
 the relational aspect, i.e. the right to know the full identity of the donor in order to 
attempt to establish a relationship with him or her’.34  
 
This research paper will focus on the identity aspect i.e. ‘the right to personal narrative 
information about the donor that could assist the child in completing the picture of her own 
                                                          
30
 See section 41(2) of the Children’s Act. 
31
 See Regulation 21 of GN 1165 GG 35099 of 30 September 2016. 
32
 Ravitsky V ‘The Right to Know One’s Genetic Origins and Cross Border Medically Assisted Conception’ (2017) 
6 Israel Journal of Health Policy Research 2. 
33
 Ravitsky V (2017) 2. 
34
 Ravitsky V (2017) 2. 
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identity’.35 Furthermore, in order for the child’s identity rights to be preserved, a right to 
know your biological origins should be recognised as part of the preservation of those 
identity rights. 
 
  A growing body of research, although primarily conducted in the adoption field, supports 
the argument that ‘knowledge of one‘s genetic background is crucial to the development of 
a sense of identity or self’.36 This is despite the fact that the comparison between donor- 
conceived children and adopted children is a controversial issue. However the use of a 
‘rights-based’ argument supporting the assertion that children conceived by donor gametes 
should have access to identifying information about their gamete donor, has gained traction 
and is currently a common expressed argument.37  
  
The ability of donor-conceived children to access information about their biological origins 
initially depends on their awareness of the circumstances surrounding their conception.38 
Without this knowledge, these children will presume that the parents who raised them 
(social parents) are their biological parents.39 Therefore, the duty to disclose the manner of 
conception rests on the parents who raised the child, unless the information is revealed by 
the state, for example through a birth certificate, or it is obvious that the child cannot be the 
biological child of both social parents.40 According to McRae ‘children who are deprived of 
knowing a biological parent or having a relationship with such a parent could grieve that 
parent‘s loss even if [she] has never met or been in contact with such parent’.41 There are 
thus several potential consequences that could transpire in these situations; the child could 
become resentful, antagonistic and exhibit disturbing and worrying behaviour.42 The child 
should at least be able identify her biological parent(s), so that she may be in a position to 
                                                          
35
 Ravitsky V (2017) 3. 
36
 SALRC Issue Paper 32 (2017) para 1.5. See also Kothari J ‘The child’s right to identity: Do adopted children 
have the right to know their parentage?’ (2010) 10 available at 
www.cry.org/resources/pdf/NCRRF/NCRRF_ReportBy_Jayna.pdf (accessed 5 August 2017). 
37
  SALRC Issue Paper 32 (2017) para 1.5. 
38
 SALRC Issue Paper 32 (2017) para 1.6. 
39
 SALRC Issue Paper 32 (2017) para 1.6 
40
 SALRC Issue Paper 32 (2017) para 1.7. 
41
 Issue Paper 32 (2017) para 1.10. See also Albertus L ‘Some unresolved complexities in matters involving 
paternity: A South African Perspective’ (2014) Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review available at 
cejsh.icm.edu/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight…/c/13_Albertus.pdf  245 (accessed 22 September 
2017).  
42
 Albertus L (2014) 245. 
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accept the circumstances surrounding her conception.43 These children may further also 
experience ‘genealogical bewilderment’, which has often been described as the feeling of 
being deprived of one‘s personal history, religious community, culture and/or race.44 Thus, 
knowing one‘s biological history would enable the child to construct her own self-identity.45  
 
This research paper will show based on the literature reviewed that the right to identity 
entails the right to have access to identifiable information about the donor, because this 
information is relevant and important to the sense of self.46 Knowing who you are requires 
knowledge of how you came to be; therefore, biological origins may be regarded as an 
important part in the process of understanding of oneself.47 Section 294 of the Children’s 
Act requires there to be a genetic link between the child and one of the commissioning 
parents. This is to protect the identity rights of the child. 
 The purpose of section 294 may be circumvented by section 41(2) and section 302 of the 
Children’s Act, which prevents the child from accessing identifiable information regarding 
the identity of the surrogate as well as the donor.  
In each of the chapters of the SALRC Issue Paper 32, the SALRC, based on its investigation 
assessed whether the child has a legal right to know her biological origins; secondly if such a 
right can be enforced, and lastly whether the current law of South Africa should be 
amended to recognise and enforce this right. These are important issues to address and by 
determining the scope and content of the identity rights of children in the realm of 
surrogacy, this research paper could assist with these issues identified by the SALRC.  
 In determining the scope and content of the identity rights of the child in the context of 
surrogacy, the focus of the research paper will be on the Children’s Act of South Africa. This 
will be done to determine whether adequate protection of the identity rights of the child is 
given by the Children’s Act. A recent landmark Constitutional Court judgment will also be 
reviewed and analysed. Other relevant legislation reviewed is the National Health Act 
                                                          
43
 Albertus L (2014) 245. 
44
 Albertus (2014) 245. See also Kothari J (2010) at pg 10. See also SALRC Issue Paper 32 (2017) para 1.10. 
45
 Albertus L (2014) 245. 
46
 Ravitsky V (2010) 674. 
47
 Ravitsky V (2010) 675. 
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(NHA)48 and the Regulations Related to the Artificial Fertilisation of People.49 The research 
paper will also discuss certain aspects, which comprises the identity of the child and 
whether the right to identity includes the right to know the circumstances surrounding birth 
and a legal right to know. This research paper will show that in order to effectively protect 
the child’s right to know her biological origins; the child is thus entitled to a legal right to 
know the circumstances surrounding her birth. International literature and International 
instruments aimed at protecting the rights of a child will also be reviewed .The aim of this 
research paper is to ensure that the scope and content of a child’s right to identity is 
adequately set out to show that it’s in the best interest of the child to have a legal right to 
know her biological origins.50 This research paper will offer a child centred approach to the 
child’s right to identity in the field of surrogacy and it will further recommend that certain 
legislative amendments be made to the Children’s Act in order adhere to the standard of 
paramount importance. 
 
1.3 Significance of research problem 
 Section 41(2)51 of the Children‘s Act prohibits the identity of a gamete donor or surrogate 
mother from being disclosed to a child or the child‘s guardian. Regulation 19 of the IVF 
Regulations state that ‘no person shall disclose the identity of any person who donated a 
gamete or received a gamete, or any matter related to the artificial fertilisation of such 
gametes, or reproduction resulting from such artificial fertilisation except where a law 
provides otherwise or a court so orders’. 52 
                                                          
48
  National Health Act 61 of 2003 (hereafter NHA). 
49
 Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons in GN 1165 GG 40312 of 30 September 2016 
(hereafter IVF regulations). 
50
 See SALRC Issue Paper 32(2017). 
51
 Section 41 Children’s Act states as follows 
‘(1) A child born as a result of artificial fertilisation or surrogacy or the guardian of such child is entitled to have 
access to- 
(a) Any medical information concerning that child's genetic parents; and 
(b) Any other information concerning that child's genetic parents but not before the child reaches the age of 
18 years. 
(2) Information disclosed in terms of subsection (1) may not reveal the identity of the person whose gamete 
was or gametes were used for such artificial fertilisation or the identity of the surrogate mother.’ 
52
 Regulation 19 of GN 1165 GG 35099 of 30 September 2016. 
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 Regulation 21 of the IVF Regulations says that ‘any person who contravenes or fails to 
comply with any provision of the regulations commits an offence and is liable on conviction 
to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or to both such fine and 
imprisonment’.53 
The identity of the parties involved in the surrogacy process is also protected. Identifying 
information regarding any donor or surrogate is not allowed to be published. The Children’s 
Act sets it out at section 302,  
 
(1) ‘The identity of the parties to court proceedings with regard to a surrogate motherhood 
agreement may not be published without the written consent of the parties concerned. 
(2) No person may publish any facts that reveal the identity of a person born as a result of a 
surrogate motherhood agreement’.54 
 
It is clear that these provisions prevent the child from knowing the identity of either her 
donor or surrogate. This is in direct contrast to the ruling of the Constitutional Court in the 
AB case that a child’s genetic origins should be protected because it is in her best interests 
to do so. As this research paper will show in chapter three, preservation of genetic origins is 
derived from a child’s right to identity. This research paper will show due to the ultimate 
ratio of the court (protection of biological origins is in the child’s best interest), the time has 
come to review all relevant legislation which deter the child born through ART and 
specifically surrogacy, access to identifiable information of the donor. Furthermore, to 
acknowledge that the child’s identity rights cannot be fully protected if these sections are 
not amended. 
Article 7 of the Convention of the Rights of Child55 contains the right to registration of birth, 
to a name, nationality and to family care. Article 8 of the CRC protects a child’s right to 
preservation of identity. Both these articles could be interpreted to protect a child’s right to 
identity even though the concept of identity is not defined.56 What the articles do contain 
                                                          
53
 Regulation 21 of GN 1165 GG 35099 of 30 September 2016. 
54
 Section 302 of the Children’s Act. 
55
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (hereinafter the CRC). 
56
 Clark B ‘A Balancing Act? The Rights of Donor Conceived Children to Know Their Biological Origins’ (2012) 40 
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 627. 
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are examples of what ‘identity’ constitutes, and furthermore that knowledge of one’s family 
relations may be interpreted to extend to the right to know one’s biological and birth 
parents.57 In the field of ART, a plurality of rights of the different role players may conflict. It 
has been broadly accepted that children have an interest to know their biological origins 
and to know identifying details.58 However, these rights may conflict with the rights of other 
people’s interest and with the public interest.59 According to Ravitsky60, literature suggests 
that a donor has a right to anonymity, parents have the right to keep the circumstances of 
conception private and donor-conceived children have the right to know their biological 
origins.61 These are often the rights that are in conflict and striving to find a balance is 
difficult. The CRC Committee however interprets the CRC as giving a definitive right to 
donor- conceived children to knowledge of their genetic identity.62 The psychological need 
to know one’s origins has been recognised as of central importance and indispensable to a 
person’s identity formulation.63 Kothari states that many researchers have agreed with this 
statement i.e. that it is indeed a core element for one’s psychological stability to know 
where one comes from and that everyone has a right to know the truth about their 
biological origins.64 This research paper will show that it is vital for South Africa to review all 
existing legislation that prohibits the child from full enjoyment of her right to identity. 
 
1.4 Literature Review 
According to Cohen65 state intervention is misplaced and that the best interest of the yet to 
be born child is used as a cover for states to intervene in a person’s reproductive choices.66 
                                                          
57
 Clark B (2012) 627. 
58
 Benson S ‘ Enforcing the Child’s Right to know her origins: Contrasting Approaches under the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child & The European Convention on Human Rights’ (2007) 21 International Journal of Law, 
Policy & the Family 138. 
59
 Benson S (2007) 138. 
60
 Ravitsky V ‘Knowing Where You Come From: The Rights of Donor Conceived Individuals & The Meaning of 
Genetic Relatedness’ (2010) 11 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology. 
61
 Ravitsky V (2010) 667.  
62
 Clark B (2012) 628. 
63
 Kothari J (2010) 10. 
64
 Kothari J (2010) 10. 
65
 Cohen IG ‘Regulating Reproduction: The problem with best interest’ (2011) 96 Minnesota Law Review 
Headnotes 423 Part I in a two part series. See also Louw A ‘Surrogacy in South Africa: Should we reconsider the 
current approach?’ (2013) 76 THRHR 569. 
66
 Louw A (2013) 569. 
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Louw states that a child centred approach is not possible when dealing with surrogacy 
(which is a service offered in the field of ART).67 The only practical way therefore to 
determine best interest of the yet to be born child is to ensure the suitability of the 
surrogate mother and the intended parents.68 Therefore, the courts should endeavour to 
protect the yet to be born child’s interest as far as reasonably possible at the time of the 
confirmation of the agreement, given the available information at the court’s disposal.69 
Alvare argues that this best interest concept makes sense if understood as a way to 
encourage the parents at pre-conception stage to step up to the level of fitness as parents 
whereby the children’s best interest comes first and the parents’ rights follow only if they 
accept this duty.70 
Crawford71 on the other hand contends that regulation of ART services targets whether 
people conceive, when and with whom.72 Hence the best interest of the yet to be born child 
justification is not logical, as a child brought into existence due to a targeted reproductive 
decision is by definition not harmed.73 Sabatello takes a more holistic approach by stating 
there should be a balance between the competing rights of parents and children.74 She 
maintains that legally, no right can be regarded as being violated simply based on being 
born under a particular set of circumstances or mode of conception.75 It is not the 
technology that dehumanises the act and ultimately violates the child’s right, but rather 
societal beliefs that tend to lead to discrimination.76 Her recommendation is that one should 
adopt a family based approach77 and not overemphasise individual rights.78 
Analysing the literature survey, one would agree with the contention of Sabatello, i.e. that 
society’s moral bias and social perceptions do have an enormous effect on policy maker’s 
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 Louw A (2013) 573. 
68
 Louw A (2013) 573. 
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 Louw A (2013) 573. 
70
 Alvare HM ‘A response to Professor I. Glenn Cohen’s “Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best 
Interests’ (2012) 96 Minnesota Law Review Headnotes 11. 
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 Crawford BJ ‘Authentic Reproductive Regulation’ (2012) 96 Minnesota Law Review Headnotes 34. 
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 Sabatello M (2013) 95. 
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 Sabatello M (2013) 90. 
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 Sabatello M (2013) 92. 
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decisions. However, one must not lose sight of the issue highlighted by the SALRC that the 
law cannot intervene after the fact, as this would be undesirable since then the problem has 
already arisen.79 The best interest of the child should at all times be the primary 
consideration as mandated by the CRC.80 This principle runs like a golden thread throughout 
the children’s rights field and there is no good reason as to why it cannot be applied in the 
sphere of ART.  
It is clear from the above that the focus has been primarily on the infringed rights of parents 
using the services of ART. This research paper will focus exclusively on the rights of the child 
and the infringement of their identity rights in the context of surrogacy. This research paper 
will advocate for the child’s legal right to know her own biological origins, which is in her 
best interest. This research paper will recommend that anonymous gamete donation and 
anonymous surrogate use no longer forms part of South African law. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
The methodology that I will be adopting is termed desk study and library research.  The 
research comprises information that is already available on the internet or published in 
books and journal articles available at the library. The research method will comprise of 
gathering and analysing information, which may support my overall recommendation. It will 
furthermore focus on the potential effect of the AB judgment in the field of South African 
surrogacy law. The Children’s Act and other relevant South African legislation will be 
reviewed. International children’s rights protection instruments will also be analysed. The 
SALRC Issue Paper 32 will also be used in support of the overall recommendation.  
 
1.6 Chapter Overview 
Chapter one, introduces the research topic, the research question as well as a brief 
overview of what the research paper will deal with. Chapter two will discuss whether the 
child’s right to identity is of paramount importance in the field of surrogacy by giving an 
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analysis of the best interests of the child standard. Chapter three will discuss a child’s right 
to identity and the different aspects, which comprise this identity. European case law on the 
identity rights of a child as well as an analysis of the landmark South African Constitutional 
Court case will be reviewed. Chapter three will cover the international children’s rights 
instruments and look at how identity is defined. This chapter will also discuss what the 
judgment of the AB case may mean in the field of surrogacy in South Africa. Chapter four 
will show that the child has a right to know about the circumstances surrounding her birth. 
It will also deal with the issue of disclosure, which is a component of the right to know one’s 
origins. This chapter will conclude that the child has a legal right to know her biological 
origins in answer to the questions posed by the SALRC in their issue paper.  It will also 
contain recommendations as to when, how and by whom disclosure should be made. 
Chapter four will also contain the conclusion and legislative recommendations. 
 
Chapter 2: Analysis of the best interest standard 
2.1 Introduction 
‘The best interest of the child is a fundamental legal principle of interpretation developed 
from a compassionate self- imposed limitation on adult power’.81 The principle is based 
upon the recognition that an adult makes decisions on behalf of a child due to the child’s 
immaturity.82 In the context of surrogacy, the child has not been born yet. Therefore, it 
remains unclear how the principle of best interest will be applied in this context. In this 
chapter, I will discuss the principle of best interest of the child; I will look at the applicable 
national as well as international instruments dealing with this principle. South African case 
law will be referred to as a guideline how this principle of best interest has been 
interpreted. The criticism against this principle will be discussed. This analysis will be done 
to delineate the groundwork for the starting point of dealing with best interest in the 
context of surrogacy. 
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2.2 Children’s rights in South Africa 
Today it is generally accepted that children have rights and a body of rules informing these 
rights is in the form of legislation.83 In South Africa, children’s rights are embodied in the 
Children’s Act84 as well as the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa85, through which 
all rights in South Africa should be interpreted. Other guiding principles, which serve as a 
yardstick from which children’s rights should be developed, are international instruments 
like the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child86 and the African Charter on 
the Welfare and Rights of the Child,87 which mandate that the rights of all children should 
be protected and developed. 
The children’s rights clause in the South African Constitution was one of the first in the 
world modelled on the principles of the CRC. The children’s rights clause is contained in the 
middle of the Bill of Rights (chapter two of the South African Constitution).88 The applicable 
section in chapter 2 is section 2889 and all the rights contained in section 28 are justiciable. 
                                                          
83
 Songca R ‘Evaluation of children’s rights in South African Law: the dawn of an emerging approach to 
children’s rights? (2011) 44 The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 343.  
84
 Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (hereinafter the Children’s Act). 
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 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter the Constitution). 
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 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (hereinafter the CRC). 
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 The African Charter of the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990 (hereinafter the ACRWC). 
88
 Chapter 2 of Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
89
 Section 28 of Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
‘(1) Every child has the right: 
 (a) To a name and a nationality from birth; 
 (b) To family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family 
environment; 
 (c) To basic nutrition, shelter, basic healthcare services and social services; 
 (d) To be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; 
 (e) To be protected from exploitative labour practices; 
 (f) Not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that: (i) Are inappropriate for a person 
of that child's age; or (ii) Place at risk the child's wellbeing, education, physical or mental health or spiritual, 
moral or social development; 
 Every child has the right: 
 (g) Not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in addition to the rights a child enjoys 
under sections 12 and 35, the child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of time, and has 
the right to be: 
 (i) Kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and 
 (ii) Treated in a manner, and kept in conditions that take account of the child’s age 
 (h) To have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in civil proceedings 
affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result; and (i) Not to be used directly in armed 
conflict, and to be protected in times of armed conflict. 
 (2) A child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.  
(3) In this section "child" means a person under the age of 18 years’. 
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Furthermore, all children in South Africa are beneficiaries of all the rights contained in the 
Bill of Rights except the right to vote. 
The protection and promotion of children’s rights has not always been the focal point of the 
international human rights agenda. Certainly, in the field of ART and more specifically 
surrogacy, the right of the child has not been the focus as will be discussed in chapter  
three of this research paper.90 One specific right, which is the focus of this paper, is the right 
of a child to know her biological parents. This is one of the most contentious issues to have 
risen over the past twenty years, as knowledge of one’s origins is something most people 
take for granted.91 According to article 3 in the CRC ‘In all actions concerning children, 
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration’.92 The CRC mandates that when dealing with actions concerning or 
affecting the child, the best interest of the child should be the primary consideration. The 
Bill of Rights in the Constitution elevates the best interest of a child to paramount 
importance when dealing with issues affecting children. The Children’s Act in section 7 sets 
several specific factors to consider when dealing with the best interest of the child standard.  
 
Based on section 28(2) of the Children’s Act it is evident that the best interest of the child 
standard should and must be applied in the context of Surrogacy. Furthermore, the best 
interest of the child should be primary consideration in all matters affecting the child. The 
meaning of the word ‘primary’ according to the Oxford English Dictionary ‘is both the 
highest rank and of belonging to the first stage in a process of compounding or 
combination’.93 In other words, ‘a primary consideration is the first stage before considering 
any other aspects’.94 Therefore, the concept of best interest is as a general principle the first 
consideration when one deals with issues affecting the child.95  Certainly, a child’s right to 
identity, to her biological origins is a right that has vast implications for the child once born 
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Review 435. 
92
 CRC article 3. 
93
 Van Bueren G (2007) 31. 
94
 Van Bueren G (2007) 31. 
95
 Van Bueren G (2007) 31. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za
  
 
 
3520223 
 
24 
 
if it is not given its due regard. The right to identity also includes the right to nationality and 
birth registration as enumerated by the CRC.  
 
The Constitution transformed the best interests of the child principle into a constitutional 
imperative. Section 28(2) of the Constitution has been understood as a guarantee, that the 
child’s best interests must be the paramount consideration in each matter concerning the 
child.96 The Constitution applies a much stricter requirement in section 28(2) in respect of 
the best interests of the child than that which is applicable in terms of article 3(1) of the CRC 
and article 4(1) of the ACRWC. Both these articles respectively dictate that a child’s best 
interest is ‘a primary consideration’ in matters concerning the child.97 Heaton concludes that 
‘the use of the word ‘paramount’ in section 28(2) of the Constitution thus elevates the best 
interests of the child to be superior in any matter concerning the child’.98 
 
 Skelton states that looking at the wording used in section 28(2) of the Constitution at face 
value, ‘the paramountacy principle may act as a ‘trump card’, outweighing all other 
factors’.99 However, the rights of the child cannot be superior to other rights since it would 
represent ‘positive discrimination’ of children against other groups, for example women, 
workers, and the disabled etc., which would be contradictory to other principles in 
international treaties and to other constitutional claims.100  
 
2.3 Case Law 
 
When assessing the child’s best interests as paramount, the court must give adequate 
attention to the rights of the parents; this does not mean that other constitutional rights, 
which are relevant, may be disregarded or limiting the best interests of the child is 
                                                          
96
 Minister of the Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 (3) SA 422 (CC) and Sonderup v 
Tondelli 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC). 
97
 Heaton J ‘An individualized, contextualised and child-centred determination of the child’s best interests, and 
the implications of such an approach in the South African context’ (2009) 34 Journal of Juridical Science 4 
extracted from Boyd MT The Determinants of the Child’s Best Interests in Relocation Disputes (Unpublished 
LLM thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2015). 
98
 Heaton J (2009) 34.2. See also Boyd MT (2015) 16.  
99
 Boyd MT (2015) 16. 
100
 Doek J & Zermatten J The rights of the Child in International Law: Rights of the Child in a nutshell and in 
context: all about children’s rights (2012) 99-100 extracted from Boyd MT (2015) 16. 
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impermissible.101 According to the court in S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae),102 
the correct approach is to apply the ‘paramountcy principle in a meaningful way without 
obliterating other valuable and constitutionally protected interests’.103 Also, according to 
Bonthuys, in order to make sense the courts’ application of the best interests’ principle in 
South Africa, ‘it is necessary to determine whether the best interests principle is a value, a 
principle of interpretation, a rule or a right’.104 Since 2000, with cases such as Christian 
Education South Africa v Minister of Education105 and Minister for Welfare and Population 
Development v Fitzpatrick,106 there has been a practice in case law to view the best interests 
as a right that is independent of the other rights contained in section 28(1) of the 
Constitution.107 However, confusingly in some of these very same cases, the best interest of 
the child is also referred to as a ‘standard’108 or a ‘principle’.109 ‘The fact that the 
Constitutional Court has not dealt with the best interests principle as it normally treats 
other rights, creates the impression that, contrary to the rhetoric, the best interests is not 
really a fundamental right, or at least not a right like all the other rights in the Bill of 
Rights’.110   
 
In the Christian Education case, besides mentioning the best interests, the court was of the 
opinion that a decision could have been based upon the child’s rights to dignity, freedom 
and security of the person in order to limit the parent’s rights to freedom of religion.111 The 
Fitzpatrick matter the court could also have adjudicated the matter based on the child’s 
right to family or parental care, or to appropriate alternate care when removed from the 
family environment.112 In the matter of Du Toit, the court reviewed legislation, which 
                                                          
101
 Heaton J South African Family law 3ed (2010) 165 extracted from Boyd MT (2015) 16. 
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 S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008(3) SA 232 (CC). 
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104
 Bonthuys E ‘The best interests of children in the South African Constitution’ (2006)20 International Journal 
of Law, Policy and the Family 5 extracted from Boyd MT (2015) 17. 
105
 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC) para 41.  
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  Minister for Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 (7) BCLR 713 (CC) para 17.  
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 Sonderup v Tondelli 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC); Du Toit Minister for Welfare and Population Development v 
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infringed the best interests of the children,113 as well as the parental rights to equality and 
dignity.  
 
In De Reuck, besides applying the best interests of the child standard,114 children’s rights to 
dignity limited an adult’s right to privacy and freedom of expression when the adult was 
found in possession of child pornography.115 The Sonderup case116 was an exception to the 
cases mentioned above, given that it concerned a direct challenge to the Hague Convention 
and the argument advanced was that the Hague Convention did not give effect to the best 
interest of children.117 According to Bonthuys, ‘these Constitutional Court cases highlight 
that the best interest principle does not have to be referred to as a right as there are other 
children’s rights which are applicable more directly in these matters’.118  
 
The above-mentioned cases seem to create the impression that when other rights of 
children are directly applicable, the best interest principle should not be applied. This seems 
illogical as the Children’s Act as well as the Constitution unequivocally states that the best 
interest must be a consideration in all matters (my emphasis) affecting the child. So 
irrespective if one is dealing with the child’s right to dignity or parental care, the court must 
ensure that the best interest standard is a primary or paramount consideration. 
 
One of the fundamental values of the rule of law is certainty, yet because the best interest 
of the child principle is open to judicial discretion there is generally no consistency in its 
application.119 Furthermore, it is difficult to determine the weight attached to each of the 
many components constituting best interests and when the principle of best interests will 
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 Du Toit Minister for Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) para 21. 
114
 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (12) BCLR 1333(CC) para 55. 
115
 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (12) BCLR 1333(CC) para 63. The children’s rights to bodily 
integrity and to be protected from abuse and degradation would have also limited the adult’s rights. Section 
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be applied as a predominant principle.120 In the next section, the critique against the best 
interest principle will be discussed. 
 
2.4 Criticism against the best interest standard 
 
The best interest principle has been criticised by many as it is open to judicial discretion and 
there is generally no consistency in its application. However, it is principle that must be 
applied. Marquadt121 raised the issue that children born as a result of ART face great 
uncertainties and vulnerabilities.122 This is specifically because the process of ART involves a 
move away from the traditional way nuclear families have been constructed.123  Scientific 
advancements in the field of reproduction and surrogacy have changed the concept of 
parentage and the definition of what a family is, as it is no longer based on a biological 
connection.124 Reproductive technologies may have given people the ability to conceive 
children despite their infertility, but it has also taken away the right of the child to ‘…know 
and be cared for by his or her parents’.125 
Cohen126 argues that the child only has interests once born, therefore if not yet conceived, 
the child’s interest should not play a role.127 He therefore states that reproductive services 
and technology should not be regulated to protect the interest of a child not yet conceived.  
Cohen also states that if there is recognition that the yet to be born child has a right to know 
her genetic origins, such a right must extend to all children irrespective of their mode of 
conception.128 
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Another argument holds that when reproductive services and the access to it are regulated, 
‘it strips individuals of agency,129 denies privileges of citizenship130 and deprives people of 
dignity and human rights’.131 There are others, who argue that regulation of ART services in 
the name of best interest of the child undeniably violates parents’ right to privacy.132  
With regard to the arguments raised by Cohen, Mutcherson contends that one has to take 
into account the interests of future children and cannot just focus on those already living.133 
Furthermore, she states that lack of knowledge of genetic origins is a denial of a basic 
human right and harm, which is preventable with the necessary regulation in place.134 
As will be discussed in chapter 3 of this research paper, the AB case was an opportune 
moment for the Constitutional Court to unequivocally apply the best interest of the child 
principle and make analysis of how this standard should be applied in the context of 
surrogacy.135 Therefore, it is unclear if a child’s right to identity is of ‘paramount importance’ 
in the context of surrogacy and how this standard should be applied when in conflict with 
rights of individuals to reproductive services.  
In the next chapter the best interests of the child will be used, as a framework to highlight 
why a child’s right to identity should be protected. The chapter will discuss how the best 
interest principle makes it imperative that the right to identity should be protected. 
 
CHAPTER 3 The child’s right to identity 
3.1 Introduction 
Surrogacy means ‘substitute’ and originates from the Latin word ‘surrogates’. It can be for 
commercial or altruistic purposes.136 It can further be divided into two sub groups, 
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131
 Mutcherson KM (2012) 49. 
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gestational surrogacy or traditional surrogacy. In gestational surrogacy, no genetic material 
of the surrogate is used. This form of surrogacy is the preferred type but is the more 
expensive one. In gestational surrogacy, the couple and the surrogate have to go through 
the process of invitro fertilisation. In traditional surrogacy the genetic material of the 
surrogate is used (her own eggs are used) and there is a genetic link between the child and 
the surrogate. This form of surrogacy is less expensive; however, it has more potential for 
legal complications should the surrogate renege on the surrogacy agreement.137 In South 
Africa when there is a genetic link between the surrogate and the child, the surrogate can 
terminate the surrogate agreement. The only requirement is that such termination occurs 
within 60 days if the child has already been born.138  There is no similar provision in the case 
where no genetic link exists between the surrogate and the child. In this instance, the 
surrogate can terminate the pregnancy, which effectively terminates the surrogacy 
agreement.139 Surrogacy is often engaged in the tangled web of trying to balance the 
interests of the various parties to the agreement, the child and society as a whole.140 
There has been an unfortunate history in the field of ART of elevating the interests of adults 
over the needs and vulnerability of children.141 In the past, the focus has been entirely on 
the adult’s ability to access ART services like surrogacy142 and less attention on the interests 
and rights of the child to be born. Somerville states that currently the focus has shifted from 
parent’s rights to access ART services, to the rights of ART born children with respect to the 
                                                          
137
 Mondal SC, Verma A & Gupta SK et al (2012) 190. 
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 Section 298 of the Children’s Act. 
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nature of their genetic heritage and knowledge of what that heritage is.143 The impact of 
these reproductive technologies on children born through the utilisation of ART services has 
primarily focused on their physical health.144 Further concerns such as the psychological 
effects on these children, have mostly been ignored.145 Surrogacy affects a child’s right to 
identity in that the process may leave the child unaware of who her biological donor(s) are. 
 
3.2 A Child’s Right to Identity 
3.2.1 Identity defined  
‘Children must move from being the voiceless citizens to becoming the new kids on the 
human rights block, and nowhere is that more important than with respect to the rights 
regarding their biological origins and biological families’.146 
 The right to identity is an existing right but lacks clear and complete definition.147 
Therefore, what does this right to identity entail?        
The CRC was the first document to recognise a child’s right to identity (identity rights are 
contained in article 7 and article 8 respectively).148 Article 7 of the CRC149 protects a child’s 
right to nationality, name and family150 and places a positive obligation on state parties to 
the Convention to implement policies that enforce and protect these rights. In the 
application and interpretation of article 7 of the CRC, the fundamental principle of the best 
interest of the child should be applied.151 Therefore, in light of the principle of best interest 
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 Somerville M ‘Children’s human rights to natural biological origins and family structure’ The Jurisprudence 
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it is clear that failure to register the birth of a child, statelessness and lack of knowledge of 
one’s biological origins as part of one’s identity and lack of a family environment are not in 
the best interests of the child.152 The CRC guarantees that the child’s best interest should be 
a primary consideration in all matters concerning the child.153  
 Article 8 of the CRC includes the right to name, nationality and family relations, and 
knowledge of one’s family relations is usually interpreted as extending to one’s biological 
and birth parents.154 Erikson has defined identity ‘as the subjective feeling of continuously 
being the same person’.155 There seems to be a consensus that identity development of the 
child develops during the course of the child’s development and at different age- related 
stages.156 The concept of identity is inclined to recognise a variety of identities a person 
could possibly have, so that the collection of all of them provides a unique identity that 
would characterise one person.157 Hence a person and by extension a child should have a 
‘family identity’, a ‘social identity’, a ‘genetic identity’ and a ‘biological identity’.158 In the 
context of surrogacy, the child born as a result of the surrogacy agreement will possibly not 
know who one of her biological parents are due to the practice of anonymity in this area. 
She may have access to non-identifiable medical information but this will only be realised if 
she is told about the circumstances of her birth. Surrogacy may therefore affect a child’s 
genetic identity- if she is not told she will not have access to medical records. It will also 
affect her biological and social identity as due to anonymous donations she may never know 
who her genetic parent is or be raised by this genetic parent. 
 One may regard article 7 and article 8 of the CRC as giving a definitive and absolute 
precedence to the interests of the child over that of her parents.159 Article 8 was inserted 
into the CRC as a result of children disappearing during the period 1975-1983 in Argentina 
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during the military junta.160 They were either kidnapped or separated from their parents 
and then fraudulently adopted.161 The delegation of Argentina then submitted a draft article 
which stated that a child has a ‘right to retain her true and genuine personal, legal and 
family identity’ and the state has an obligation to preserve such identity. 162 Due to the fact 
that article 7 already includes the right to name, nationality, birth registration and to family 
care, article 8 of the CRC can be interpreted to protect an independent right.163 This is 
inclusive of the right to identifiable information about the donor. Due to present day 
developments and a bold interpretation of the CRC, the right to be informed about your 
biological origins164 can be read into the preservation of identity rights. Preservation of a 
child’s right to identity can only be realised if one acknowledges that a child has a right to be 
informed about her biological origins.   
 
3.2.2 Importance of knowing your biological origins 
Separating the role of the mother between different women in the process of surrogacy 
(egg donor, commissioning woman and birth mother) and the role of the father (sperm 
donor, commissioning man) also breaches the child’s right to know  her biological origin and 
identity, as guaranteed by article 7 and article 8 of the CRC.165 
A child born through surrogacy may never have the opportunity to know her surrogate 
mother, irrespective of whether she has provided genetic material or not.166 This deprives 
the child of her right to identity insofar as it includes the right to know one’s origins. The 
right to know one’s origins amounts to the right to know one’s parentage i.e. one’s 
biological family, family history and circumstances surrounding one’s conception.167 The 
interest protected here is the right to know where you come from.168 The right to identity 
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entails many aspects besides those mentioned in article 7 and article 8 of the CRC. It 
includes aspects of psychological wellbeing and development of personal identity.169 
Withholding information relating to identification of biological parents negatively affects the 
child’s sense of personal identity.170 Furthermore, the right to identity includes the right to 
know one’s medical family history and genetic lineage in order to be aware of health 
risks.171 Lack of information regarding medical family history and genetic heritage can also 
negatively affect the child’s health planning.172 These health risks should be made available 
to donor-conceived children as soon as possible so that they can make informed decisions 
regarding their health. 
The argument has been made that when undertaking surrogacy, couples are motivated by 
the need to have offspring that bear a genetic link with the commissioning parents.173 The 
report of the SALRC and the recommendation that altruistic surrogacy be allowed was also 
based on the fact that surrogacy would fulfil the need of parents to conceive a child who is 
biologically related to them.174 However, Van Niekerk argues that the right to know one’s 
genetic origins does not relate to requiring genetic material in the case of surrogacy.175 
There are also certain studies, which indicate that biological relatedness between parents 
and children is not essential for positive child adjustment.176 However, the right to identity is 
a basic human right, irrespective of the lack of empirical data as to whether that knowledge 
is beneficial or not.177 If the truth is not revealed regarding her origins, she is being wrongly 
treated.178  
Identity is the individuals’ social profile, which makes them unique from other human beings 
and genetic code is regarded as one of the distinguishing features.179 When one is 
prevented from knowing your biological origins or enjoying a relationship with your birth 
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family due to lack of information and access, it can affect your ability to develop a full sense 
of identity.180 
 In the context of surrogacy, there is a lack of sufficient data on the donor- conceived child’s 
views regarding her conception; this is due to the secrecy and non- disclosure surrounding 
the practice.181 Based on a study founded by the SALRC during their investigation of parental 
disclosure conducted during 2002, as little as 5% of parents had disclosed to their donor- 
conceived children nearing adolescence, information regarding the circumstances 
surrounding their conception.182 
Thus far, an analysis of how the CRC and the Committee of the CRC has defined a child’s 
right to identity in the context of ART and specifically surrogacy has been elaborated. The 
importance of the identity right of a child has also been highlighted. In the next section a 
case discussion about the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights183 on 
surrogacy and identity rights will be done.  These judgments provide an illustration of how 
the principle of the best interest of the child has been applied when it comes to the identity 
rights of children born through the process of ART and more specifically surrogacy. 
Furthermore, in one case it is clear that the ECtHR view the right to know your biological 
origins as so important that this right does not end once adulthood commences. 
 
3.3 European Case Law 
The ECtHR has been called upon to make judgments regarding a child’s right to identity. The 
ECtHR had to decide whether this includes identifying information of the donor. The earliest 
case is Rose v Secretary of the State for Health184 in which the applicant upon reaching the 
age of maturity sought review of the state’s decision not to release information regarding 
the identity of her biological father. The policy argument advanced was that children have a 
right to know they were conceived through ART. The court found that the applicant had a 
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right to identifying information. The court interpreted article 8(1)185 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights186 to include the right of a child to establish the details of her 
identity.  This right included the right to know her biological parents, social parents and the 
person who carried her during pregnancy.187  The court furthermore found that the reality 
of the right to know is not based on the concern for individual emotional health but rather 
on the idea that no person or state entity has the right to decide on another’s behalf 
whether that person should or should not know about their own biological history.188 
A different approach was adopted in the case of Odievre v France189 . The biological mother 
of the applicant upon giving birth to the applicant had requested that the details of the birth 
be kept secret. Her identity as the mother was then kept secret and the birth certificate of 
the applicant was declared null and void. The applicant was later adopted and when she 
became of age obtained access to her file, which was under the supervision of the children’s 
welfare services. She gained access to extensive non-identifying information through which 
she discovered that she had other biological siblings. Upon discovering that she had siblings, 
she then requested the release of the full records of her birth. The rules in France regarding 
confidentiality on birth prevented the applicant from obtaining information about her 
natural family. The French court found no violation of article 8 of the ECHR. The ECtHR 
found at para 29 that matters which are of relevance to personal development, are inclusive 
of details of a person’s identity as a human being and the core interests protected by the 
Convention.190 Therefore, obtaining vital information necessary to reveal the truth 
concerning important aspects of one’s personal identity included the identity of one’s 
parents.191 However, the court noted that the applicant had been given access to extensive 
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non-identifying information about her mother, which would place her in a position to trace 
her roots, while also ensuring the protection of the privacy rights of the mother and her 
other biological children.192 In the present case, the court found that France had struck a 
balance between the protection of third party privacy rights and the child’s vital interest to 
know her origins.193 The court noted that this case did not concern a conflict between the 
rights of an adult and those of a child, but a conflict between the competing rights of two 
adults, both of them equipped with their own free will.194  
The court further noted that the anonymous birth problem could not be addressed 
separately from the issue of the protection of third parties, which were essentially the 
adoptive parents; the father and the other members of the natural family.195 The court 
noted that the applicant was now an adult and that disclosure without the consent of the 
affected parties, could entail substantial risks for all involved, each of whom also had a right 
to respect to their private and family life.196 There was also a general interest at risk, as the 
domestic legislature had invariably sought to protect the mother's and child's health during 
pregnancy and birth in order to avoid abortions, in particular illegal abortions and to 
prevent children being abandoned other than under the proper procedure.197 In addition, 
the court noted that a National Council on Access to Information about Personal Origins had  
recently been established, which the applicant could now use to request disclosure of her 
birth mother's identity, subject to the mother’s consent being obtained to ensure that her 
need for protection and the applicant's legitimate request was fairly reconciled.198 
In the case of Jaggi v Switzerland199 a judgment delivered in the same year as the ODievre 
the ECtHR came to a different conclusion. Although not a surrogacy case, the court seemed 
to view the knowledge of biological parentage as essential to the development of identity.  
The applicant, Andreas Jaggi a Swiss national wanted to do DNA testing on the deceased to 
ascertain if the deceased was his biological father.  
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 The court found that refusal to authorise the DNA testing by the state affected the personal 
life of the applicant. It was held that the right to identity included the right to know one’s 
parentage and as such is an integral part of one’s private life.200 The court found that a fair 
balance had to be struck between the right to identity and the rights of third parties not to 
be forced to make themselves available for medical testing.201 However, the applicant had 
an overriding interest202 and that to establish the identity of ascendants was an important 
interest to be protected.203 With reference to the circumstances of the case and the 
overriding interest at stake for the applicant, the Swiss authorities failed to secure to him 
the respect for his private life, to which he is entitled under the Convention.204 
In Menneson v France205 and Labasssee v France,206 the ECtHR found in essence that the 
best interest of the child must prevail and that France had violated the child’s article 8 rights 
by failing to recognise the birth certificate.207 The applicants had been unable to secure 
recognition under French law of the legal parent-child relationship secured between them in 
the United States, as the French authorities maintained that the surrogacy agreements 
entered into by the applicants were unlawful.  With regard to the children’s right to respect 
for their private life, the court noted that they were in a state of legal uncertainty: the 
French authorities although aware that the children had been recognised in another country 
as the children of the applicants, they had still been denied status under French law.208 The 
court considered that the refutation undermined the children’s identity within French 
society.209 Moreover, although their biological father was French, they faced uncertainty as 
to the possibility of obtaining French nationality, a situation that would have unintended 
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consequences on the definition of their own identity.210 The court further observed that 
they could only inherit from Mr and Mrs Mennesson as legatees, which meant that their 
inheritance rights would also be negatively affected; the court regarded this as a further 
deprivation of a component of their identity in relation to their parentage.211 The effects of 
the refusal to recognise a parent-child relationship in French law between children born 
following surrogacy treatment abroad and the couples who had the treatment, were not 
just confined to the couples, but also had the consequence of extending to the children.212 
The children’s right to respect for their private life, which implied that everyone should be 
able to establish the essence her identity, including their parentage, was therefore affected 
substantially. There was therefore a serious incompatibility between the situation, and the 
children’s best interests, which must guide any decision concerning them.213 The court also 
found that because of the biological connection between the one parent and the child, the 
importance of biological parentage as a component of each individual’s identity, it would 
not be in the best interests of the child to deprive him or her of a legal tie of this nature.214 
In preventing the recognition and establishment of the children’s legal relationship with 
their biological father, the French state had overstepped the permissible margin of 
appreciation.215 The court found that there had been a violation of the children’s right to 
respect for their private life, in breach of Article 8.216 
In Foulon v France217 and Bouvet v France218 at issue was the non-recognition in France of 
the paternity of intending biological fathers’ of children born to surrogates in India. In both 
cases, the applicants have been unable to obtain recognition under French law of their 
biological affiliation as established in India. The French authorities, suspecting recourse to 
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unlawful gestational surrogacy agreements were refusing to transcribe the birth certificates, 
which were issued in India.  
 The ECtHR found that there was a violation of the child’s article 8 rights but the court did 
not find that there was a violation of the applicants’ parents’ rights.219 The court found that 
the circumstances of the applicants were similar to those of the applicants in 
the Mennesson and Labassee cases and decidedly found no reason to deviate from its 
previous reasoning.220 The court also found that a violation of the right to respect for 
private life of the children had occurred, but that no violation of the right to respect for 
family life was proved on the facts.221 The ECtHR delivered a judgment protecting the 
rights of children born through the conclusion of an international commercial surrogacy 
agreement to have their relationships with their biological parents legally recognised.222  
At the heart of the reasoning of the court was the principle that where a child is 
concerned, the best interests of that child must be paramount.223 Although the court 
recognised the ‘margin of appreciation’ of member states to prohibit surrogacy 
agreements domestically, the court’s decision in this matter limits the legal effect of 
such prohibitions where commercial surrogacy occurs abroad.224 The court held that 
while the state may prohibit surrogacy agreements, once the child is born through 
surrogacy, the state's laws could not be used to prejudice the child’s rights.225  
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3.4 Key points of the Report of the Special Rapporteur 
 The Special Rapporteur for the Council of Europe Petra De Sutter, tasked with drafting a 
recommendation to the Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development 
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The above judgments of the ECtHR indicate that the best interest of the child has guided the 
decisions of the court in the context of surrogacy as well as in instances where the right to 
know biological origins is being hampered by state laws. The ECtHR recognises that the 
recognition of legal parentage and access to identifiable information of donors is integral to 
a child’s right to identity. Although a margin of appreciation is afforded to states to maintain 
their sovereignty when it comes to the imposition of national legislation, the CRC mandates 
that the best interest of the child must be a primary consideration when dealing with issues, 
which affect the child.  The court has also declared that the provision of article 8 in the ECHR 
does not include a right to create a family.226  
In the next section, the findings of the Special Rapporteur tasked by the Committee on 
Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development of the Parliamentary Assembly in Europe 
will be discussed. The report relates to the human rights and ethical issues related to 
surrogacy and one of the purposes of the report was to consider the desirability and 
feasibility of drawing up European guidelines to safeguard children’s rights, also specifically 
rights protected by the CRC in relation to surrogacy agreements.227 This is relevant to South 
Africa as the report concludes that tighter regulation of surrogacy is needed in order to 
protect the best interest of the child. Europe is moving away from anonymous donation in 
order to protect the identity rights of the child. The purpose of this research paper as 
indicated in chapter one is to establish clear motivation why South Africa should do the 
same. Legislative reform is needed in order to be compliant with the decision of the 
Constitutional Court case of AB. 
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of the Parliamentary Assembly in Europe regarding surrogacy228,  found that members of 
the Committee and its Parliamentary Assembly as a whole were divided on the human rights 
and ethical issues related to surrogacy.229 
De Sutter recommended that altruistic surrogacy should not be prohibited and should be 
limited to gestational surrogacy (therefore where there is no genetic link between surrogate 
and child), should be tightly regulated and only legally available to resident nationals of the 
jurisdiction in question.230 This recommendation could assist the child to establish more 
readily her genetic origin, as the donors would then be nationals of the country in which the 
child resides as well as the surrogate. She makes the point that the CRC has guaranteed the 
rights of children for 25 years now231 and that the rights of the child cannot be curtailed 
simply because intending parents flouted national law when it forbade surrogacy.232 
Her concluding remarks, which are in line with the judgement of the ECtHR, are that there is 
no right to a child, but that children have rights that need to be respected even by states.233 
She reiterates for states to make adoption a more viable alternative to surrogacy, providing 
a child with loving parents and fulfilling infertile couple’s desire for a child -the best 
outcome for all.234 
 
3.5 South Africa 
‘Legislative regulation of the content, conclusion and confirmation of surrogate motherhood 
agreements is essential to give effect to the best interests of the child’.235 During 2016, the 
SALRC launched an investigation regarding the right to know one’s own biological origins. 
The SALRC states that the aim of the research is to establish whether a child has a legal right 
(my emphasis) to know her biological origins. One of the issues the SALRC identified as a 
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motivating factor for South Africa to reconsider the current legal position regarding 
anonymous gamete donation, is the recent Constitutional Court case of AB. The SALRC 
clearly states that given the decision in the AB case; South Africa needs to review the 
practise of anonymous gamete donation in surrogacy and other forms of assisted 
reproduction.  
 
3.5.1. AB and another v Minister of Social Development and others     
In the case of AB, section 294 of the Children’s Act was under constitutional scrutiny. The 
particular section dictates that no surrogacy agreement is valid unless there is a genetic link 
between the child and at least one of the commissioning parents. AB236 was a single female 
at the time when she wanted to conclude a surrogacy agreement, but did not have any 
gametes of her own to use as she was past the age at which she still produced gametes. She 
was also unable to act as a gestational carrier.  
The case started in the high court where similar arguments to those before the 
Constitutional Court were raised. 
 
3.5.2 Factual Background of the case  
 During the period 2001 to 2011, AB underwent 18 in vitro fertilisation (IVF) cycles, which 
were all unsuccessful in helping her fall pregnant. In 2001, when she was in her early 40’s,  
she underwent two cycles of IVF treatment by using her own ova and her then-husband’s 
sperm. These endeavours proved unsuccessful on both occasions. After the second cycle 
failed, her gynaecologist advised AB that it would no longer be feasible to continue 
harvesting her own ova; she was unable to supply her own gametes for the purpose of 
conceiving a child. For this reason, AB then undertook a third IVF cycle using anonymous 
donor ova and the sperm of her then-husband. These attempts also failed. After her 
marriage ended, she then used anonymous donor ova as well as donor sperm, repeating the 
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process nine times, on each occasion unsuccessfully. At a later stage, AB was informed that 
the chances of successful conception by way of IVF treatment had become improbable. 
 
 AB was thus permanently and irreversibly infertile in two different senses: first, she was 
unable to contribute her own gametes for conception and second, she was unable to carry a 
pregnancy to term. Later in 2009, the option of surrogacy was mentioned to AB as means to 
have a child. As a single woman who was unable to donate her own ova, the only way for AB 
to proceed was to use both donor ova and donor sperm. 
 
However, during consultation with an attorney, AB was informed that she could not as a 
single woman incapable of donating a gamete, enter into a legal surrogacy agreement 
because of section 294 of the Children’s Act. 
 
Against this backdrop, AB approached the high court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, 
Pretoria, seeking an order declaring section 294 of the Children’s Act inconsistent with the 
Constitution and invalid. The Surrogacy Advisory Group and the Centre for Child Law (The 
Centre) were subsequently joined as second applicant and amicus curiae respectively. The 
respondent was the Minister of Social Development cited in her capacity as the Minister 
responsible for the administration of the Children’s Act. 
 
The Surrogacy Advisory Group, which represented the interest of AB, argued that section 
294 of the Children’s Act violated AB’s rights to equal protection before the law, the right to 
human dignity, reproductive autonomy and privacy.237  
 
The Minister opposed the application and argued that it was not only AB’s rights that were 
at issue, but also those of the child to be created by the surrogate mother and donor(s). The 
Minister contended that: ‘the prospective child has the right to know her genetic origins, 
the adoption process in South Africa catered for AB’s need to have a child, to allow a single 
infertile person to create a child with no genetic link to her would result in the creation of a 
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“designer”238 child, this would not be in the public interest and that section 294 prevents 
commercial surrogacy’.239 
The Centre stated that the purpose of chapter 19 of the Children’s Act in general and of 
section 294 in particular is to regulate surrogacy agreements in order to protect the rights of 
the child to be born. This purpose is achieved by ensuring that the child knows her genetic 
origin. The heading of section 294 is indicative of this. In the Centre’s view, genetic origin is 
something that belongs to the prospective child. The Centre insisted that the risk to 
children’s self-identity and self -respect – their dignity and their best interests- are all 
important. Section 294 was accordingly rationally connected to the purpose of ensuring that 
children know their genetic origin.240  
The high court241  concluded that ‘section 294 of the Children’s Act unjustifiably violates 
AB’s rights to equality, human dignity, “reproductive autonomy”, privacy and access to 
health care’.242 In order for the Constitutional Court to confirm the order of invalidity of the 
High Court, the following had to be looked at: 
(1) ‘Is the impugned legislation irrational in terms of section 9(1) of the Constitution;  
(2) Are AB’s implicated rights to equality; dignity; bodily integrity including the right to make 
decisions concerning reproduction; access to reproductive health care; and privacy are 
limited by the genetic link requirement in terms of section 294 and if so;  
(3) Is the limitation of the rights justifiable in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution’.243 
 
3.5.3 Majority decision analysis 
3.5.3 (a) Section 9 (1) of the Constitution and the issue of irrationality 
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At the outset, the majority emphatically states the case is about the validity of section 294 
of the Children’s Act and not whether the genetic link requirement in that section has 
relevance to the legal conception of family.244 
The argument the Surrogacy Advisory Group raised stated that the genetic link requirement 
of section 294 is irrational and inconsistent with section 9(1) of the Constitution. The 
requirement is irrational because the IVF Regulations permit a person to use double donor 
gametes but with surrogacy, double donor gametes is not allowed.245 The majority found 
the argument to be flawed and stated the correct approach when a legislative measure is 
challenged, is to determine if there is a rational connection between the means chosen and 
the objective sought to be achieved. They stated that ‘a mere differentiation does not 
render a legislature measure irrational; the differentiation must be seen to be arbitrary or 
must manifest naked preferences which serve no legitimate governmental purpose’.246 The 
Justices go on to state that surrogacy is regulated by the Children’s Act and IVF is regulated 
by the IVF Regulations, which are enacted in terms of the NHA.247 The objectives of both 
these acts are different. A statutory provision cannot be measured against a regulation 
under different legislation to decide whether it is rational or consistent with the 
Constitution, it is only when it is found to serve no legitimate government purpose, then it is 
inconsisitent with section 9(1) of the Constitution.248 The legitimate measure chosen by the 
legislature in section 294 is rationally related to the public good sought to be achieved by 
government i.e. the establishment of a genetic link between commissioning parent and child 
in order to safeguard the genetic origins of the child. Therefore, the court cannot interfere 
with the lawfully chosen measure on the ground that the legislature should have taken 
other considerations into account or should have considered a different decision that is 
preferable.249 The majority explains that the section merely regulates the conclusion of a 
valid surrogacy agreement and that it does not disqualify AB from concluding a surrogacy 
agreement.250 
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At para 244, the court states that the rationale of the AD Hoc Committee’s recommendation 
was that if both donor male and female gametes were to be used, then the situation would 
be similar to adoption and then surrogacy would not be needed. The court makes a 
comment that the rational purpose is to create a bond between the child and the 
commissioning parents;251  if a genetic link exists between commissioning parent and child, 
it is more likely that the commissioning parents would more readily take the child after 
birth. If there was no genetic link, it would be easier for the commissioning parents to 
abandon the child.  Creation of this bond was designed to protect the best interest of the 
child yet to be born.252  
If the process of surrogacy allowed for a surrogate (whom the child may never get to know) 
and two anonymous donors of sperm and egg,253 there would be too many unknown people 
in the creation of the child, which would not be in the best interest of the child. 
The majority criticises the finding of the high court, which stated that the Minister of Social 
Development and the Centre for Child Law had failed to produce credible data to 
demonstrate that the presence or absence of a genetic link in the context of surrogacy will 
have adverse effects on the child.254 In this way, the high court had elevated empirical 
research above the purposive construction of the challenged provision.255 The high court 
had overemphasised the interests of the commissioning parents and had overlooked the 
best interest of the child.256 
 
3.5.3 (b) Discrimination 
At para 300 of the judgment the court comes to the conclusion that chapter 19 favours 
commissioning parents as well as the surrogate and gives effect to the best interest of the 
child. It therefore does not disqualify due to infertility, it affords the person a chance to 
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have a child of their own.257 The court states that it is ABs personal choice, which 
disqualifies her,258 and that she could fall in the ambit of section 294 if she concluded a 
relationship with someone who could donate gametes. Furthermore, the alleged ground of 
discrimination is not based on the attributes and characteristics of AB; the section neither 
creates nor compounds infertility,259 in essence, it favours infertile commissioning 
parents.260 
3.5.3 (c) Limitation of reproductive autonomy 
The majority once more reiterates that section 294 merely regulates the conclusion of a 
valid surrogacy agreement261; the section therefore merely regulates choices that are open 
to the applicant. With regard to the right to reproductive autonomy the court looked at 
comparable jurisdictions and at section 12(2) (a) of the Constitution and finds that such right 
cannot extend to the body of another person.262 To interpret section 12(2) (a) of the 
Constitution in such a manner would unduly strain the interpretation.263  
The Constitutional Court does not go into detail regarding a child’s right to identity and how 
one should approach the issue when it is in conflict with other human rights. The Justices 
merely assert that a child’s genetic origin should be protected as it is in the best interest of 
the child to do so. No analysis of how to apply the best interest of the child in surrogacy is 
given. The court merely asserts that there is no right to conclude a lawful surrogacy 
agreement and that section 294 merely regulates the option of surrogacy.264 Hence, section 
294 in the Children’s Act has survived Constitutional scrutiny and, although not expressly 
stated, the child’s right to know her genetic origins is indirectly protected. 
3.5.4 Minority decision analysis 
The key points of the minority decision can be summarised as follows: 
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The minority at para 93 of the judgment finds that section 294 of the Children’s Act takes 
away the option of having a child through the process of surrogacy for infertile single 
parents. The minority decision criticizes the majority finding that the case is about the 
validity of section 294 and not about the genetic link requirement in that section which has 
relevance to the legal conception of the family.265 The minority indicates that one cannot 
separate the two, especially in terms of; to what extent one kind of family life is privileged 
over the other. 266 The minority states that section 294 affects the psychological integrity of 
AB267 and that it limits her rights.268 According to the minority section 294 violates ABs 
Constitutional rights specifically section 12(2) (a) - by limiting her right to psychological 
integrity by preventing her to make decisions concerning reproduction.269 
A further conclusion by the minority is that the real purpose of the section is to discourage 
the use of surrogacy where other sufficiently similar avenues are available.270 The minority 
suggest that the section puts genetic origin above any other interest.271  
With respect to the findings of the minority, one must not forget to evaluate section 294 of 
the Children’s Act in conjunction with the whole of chapter 19 of the Children’s Act; one 
cannot look at the section in isolation. Section 294 simply regulates surrogacy and the 
option of surrogacy is only available to irreversibly infertile people. The purpose of the 
section is not to elevate genetics above anything else. Surrogacy was legalised and regulated 
as a way for people to have a child genetically related to them. If one does not want or 
cannot have a child genetically related to you then adoption or IVF is an alternative option. 
Although the processes are not the same and are markedly different, the option is still 
there. There exists no right to surrogacy, as this option is not open to everyone; financial 
implications would exclude a large amount of people as not everyone can afford it. The 
section creates a balance between conflicting rights of all parties involved and regulates the 
option of surrogacy fairly in order to protect the best interest of the child. It protects an 
inherent right that all people are born with, which is a part of who they are. The section 
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therefore strikes an appropriate balance. Surrogacy was regulated and enacted to fulfil the 
need to have a child of your own. If one looks at the para 181 and 182 of the minority 
judgment it appears that the minority seems to view becoming a parent through surrogacy a 
better option than adoption. This is exactly what the legislature is trying to prevent -
circumvention of adoption, an argument raised by the Minister of Social Development in the 
high court. That removal of the genetic link requirement would make adoption a less viable 
option for people and further more encourage ‘designer’ babies.  
 
3.5.5 Conclusion 
Section 294 of the Children’s Act has survived Constitutional scrutiny. Although an analysis 
of how the standard of best interest of the child in the context of surrogacy was not given 
by the court, the child’s right to identity and more specifically to genetic identity has been 
preserved and the Constitutional Court has declared that this right is in the best interest of 
the child. The next chapter will argue that in order for the identity rights of the child to be 
fully protected, there must be recognition that the identity rights is inclusive of the right to 
know biological origins. The chapter will show that the right to know biological origins is the 
mechanism through which the identity rights of the child can be realised.  
 
Chapter 4 The child’s right to know her biological origins 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will be laying the basis for an argument alluded to in chapter 3; that the 
preservation of the identity rights of a child conceived through the means of ART and 
specifically surrogacy is only possible by recognising the child’s right to know her biological 
origins. I will look at specific sections within the Children’s Act, which may defeat the 
purpose of section 294 of the Children’s Act. I will argue that in order for a child’s genetic 
origin and specifically the right to identity to be protected, the child has a right to know the 
circumstances surrounding her birth. Furthermore, this chapter will look at the questions 
posed by the SALRC Issue Paper 32 relevant to surrogacy in an attempt to answer those 
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questions. Subsidiary issues related to the realisation of identity rights will be discussed: 
issues like when disclosure of the circumstances of the birth should be made, the 
appropriate age of disclosure and by whom disclosure should be made. Enforcement 
mechanisms and possible legislative implementations will be suggested. This chapter will 
also look at the rights regarding the privacy of parties to the surrogacy agreement that may 
be impacted.  
 
4.2 The child’s right to know her biological origins 
The question whether children should be informed about their biological origins is a 
contentious issue.272 ‘[I]nformational interest represents a constitutional legal value for the 
person concerned having regard to the child’s (progressive autonomy)…. and ‘informational 
self-determination’ may become empty constitutional shells as long as the concerned 
individual remains ignorant of the underlying disparity’.273 In other words based on the 
decision of the AB case, if the best interests of the child dictates that there be a genetic link 
between the child and one of the commissioning parents, in order to protect the child’s 
right to identity, those same interests would dictate that there be a corresponding duty to 
inform the child of his genetic origins.274 The rights protected are only realisable once the 
child is born therefore they cannot fully serve their purpose if the protection starts and ends 
at the pre-conception stage. The realisation of the right to know will only occur if the donor-
conceived child has a legal right to be informed that she was conceived through 
surrogacy.275 This is however not possible under the current regulatory scheme in South 
Africa. As previously mentioned in chapter one, the SALRC embarked on an investigation in 
2016, to determine if the child has a legal right to know her biological origins.276According to 
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the investigations of the SALRC, it is clear that the current legal position of South Africa 
prohibits disclosure.277 
 
4.3 Other applicable legislation 
The NHA of South Africa read with regulation 19 of the IVF Regulations also contains barriers 
to the realisation of the child’s right to know her biological origins. The relevant regulation, 
which creates a barrier to the child’s right to know her biological origins states the following: 
‘No person shall disclose the identity of any person who donated a gamete or received a 
gamete, or any matter related to the artificial fertilisation of such gametes, or reproduction 
resulting from such artificial fertilisation’.278 
 
The regulations go further to make it a criminal offence if there is no compliance with any of 
the regulations: 
  
‘Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of these regulations 
commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 10 years, or to both such fine and imprisonment’.279 
 
It is clear that the NHA read with the applicable regulations impedes a child’s right to 
identity and further the right to know the story of her origins. 
As concluded in chapter 2, the quest for the right to identity is based on the child’s right to 
privacy or respect for private life, to autonomy and freedom of expression.280 The right to 
know one’s origins is encapsulated in the right to identity and has been held to be an 
essential part of the right to respect for one’s private life.281 This was confirmed by the 
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dissenting judgement in Odievre that the right to identity constitutes ‘the inner core of the 
right to respect for one’s private life’.282  Anne Hartman stated: 
‘There is no better way to subjugate human beings than to silence them. There is nothing 
more oppressive than denying another’s reality’.283 
Surrogacy is a lived reality for a child, whether or not the child knows about the surrogacy. 
Non-disclosure will not change the circumstances of the child’s birth therefore, disclosure is 
important in all families. Children tend to want to know their story as they grow up; they 
want to be told about their story plus the stories of the lives of their parents, grandparents 
and extended families.284 These stories form the history or narrative of the child’s life and is 
needed by children to enable their understanding of their place in the broader extended 
family and the wider community.285 The next section will look more closely at disclosure  
 
4.4 Disclosure  
‘I seem to have a compelling need to know my own story. It is a story that I should not be 
excluded from since it is at least partly mine and it seems vaguely tragic and somehow 
unjust that it remains unknown to me’.286 
The right to identity cannot be realised without fulfilling the right to know your genetic 
origins. The child cannot fully realise her identity rights without knowing all the aspects that 
influences her identity. Therefore, there is a need for disclosure. This disclosure should 
come from the parents. ‘It has been suggested that ‘parents’ whether socio-legal parents or 
biological, hold ‘procreational responsibility’ to tell children about their parentage’.287 What 
this means is that because the parents ultimately chose to utilise the ART services and they 
are responsible for the child during her lifetime, they bear the responsibility of ensuring that 
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the child be told. Viewed therefore from the point of the right to know, they need to ensure 
that the information is available.288 
Currently in South Africa, in the field of surrogacy and other assisted reproductive 
technologies, disclosure regarding the circumstances of birth is not allowed. The legislature 
goes as far as to make it a criminal offence to publish any such details. Surrogates and 
donors enjoy a cloak of anonymity. It is the recommendation of this research paper that in 
order for the child to enjoy the full protection of the right to identity, not only should the 
child’s genetic link to one of her commissioning parent’s be protected but, that her right to 
know her biological origins should be part of that protection. This is needed so that she can 
enjoy her right to identity as stated in the CRC as well as her constitutional right, that her 
best interest should at all times be of paramount importance.  
‘If children are not told about the means of their conception, the right to know and identity 
is effectively useless to them’.289  The case that offspring have a right to the truth about 
their conception and origins has developed over many years. John Triseliotis has argued that 
‘truth is always better than deception [and] that no one has the right to erase part of 
yourself, even if it is only a minor part’.290 Family therapy practitioners have claimed that 
truthfulness and transparency is preferable, and that basing family life on deception and 
secrecy can cause turmoil within the family.291 Mary Warnock insists that there is an ethical 
imperative to tell, even while saying:  
 
‘I cannot argue that children, who are told of their origins, if they are AID [artificial 
insemination donor] children, are necessarily happier, or better off in any way that can be 
estimated. But I do believe that if they are not told they are being wrongly treated’.292  
 The main reason for telling the child the circumstances surrounding her conception, is to 
provide her with the option of seeking information about her gamete donor, or surrogate, if 
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she so desires.293 The child should be given the option of whether or not to request 
identifying information of the donor or surrogate. This decision should not be made on her 
behalf. As it is her right to identity, which is at stake and by disclosing, the child’s right to 
identity is therefore preserved. Most of the evidence about harm caused by not knowing 
one’s biological origin has been extracted from research conducted in the field of 
adoption.294  It is questionable whether this is an accurate comparison.295 Children 
conceived via surrogacy or IVF differs within their respective families, from that of adoptive 
children—their biological parents have not abandoned them and they are often biologically 
related to one member of the couple.296 As Susan Golombok says, ‘Genetic unrelatedness 
has a different meaning for children conceived by gamete donation than for children in 
adoptive families or in stepfamilies’. 297 Still, one can infer that donor- conceived children 
have just as much interest in knowing about their biological origins, as adoptees have. ‘The 
absence of information about their genetic parent(s), including the lack of knowledge of 
their identity can represent a missing part of their lives’. 298Even though the process may 
differ, both children have similar concerns regarding their genetic identities.299 
 
4.5 Age of disclosure 
The truth regarding the circumstances surrounding a child’s conception may be revealed 
from sources outside the family.300 Lack of information regarding biological origins has 
significant implications for the development of identity and maturation process for the 
child.301 ‘If that origin is incorrect or significantly incomplete, the child faces personal 
identity risks’.302 These risks can originate when the parent is unable for any reason to speak 
of the circumstances surrounding the child’s birth and the child in this situation most 
commonly assumes that the parents discomfort is a reflection of shame associated with 
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their origins.303 The parent may be unwilling to discuss the details of the child’s birth due to 
their personal feelings, pain and sadness remembering the process.304 This may inspire the 
belief in the child that she is bad.305 Therefore, parents who can speak and who are more 
willing and open about the process of the child’s beginning provide the child with 
confidence of their own self-worth.306 The child will accept the parent’s story without 
concern especially when young.307  
 Children under the age of 5 years have limited understanding of complex relationships.308 
They are very literal in their thinking (they focus on the here and now) and understanding of 
biological relationships usually develop between the ages of 7-9 years.309 Between the age 
of 5-9 years children become involved with people outside the family and at this stage, they 
need to feel safe and understand their role in the family.310 Between the ages of 7-9, 
children are ready to understand the reality of their own biology and the difference 
between biological and non-biological parents.311 
During adolescence two major processes takes place, namely identity formation and 
puberty.312 Adolescence is a difficult time for children and during this period, the child 
begins to have a greater understanding of human relationships and similarities and 
differences between people.313 The reality is that only a small percentage of children will be 
born via surrogacy so it is extremely hard and rare to find someone with a common 
experience. 314 
Literature would suggest that 10 is a noteworthy age, therefore it is recommended to tell 
the child about her biological origins before the age of 10.315 Before the age of 10, the child 
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will accommodate things more easily than later.316 After the age of 10 years, children enter 
the stage of forming their own identity and processing new information becomes more 
complex.317 A study has found that telling donor-conceived children before the young age of 
7 years results in more positive family relationships and higher levels of adolescent well -
being.318 Furthermore, studies have shown that the age of disclosure is important and that 
children told before adolescence have more positive experiences regarding their mode of 
conception.319 ‘Research on children’s developing understanding of biological inheritance 
has shown that children have an implicit understanding of biological inheritance of physical 
characteristics by age 4.320 It is not until age 7 that they are able to explain this concept and 
understand the role of genetic mechanisms’.321 During adolescence, the child will be 
processing what she has already been told about her family and how that intersects with 
her evolving identity.322 It is an easier task to already know about the surrogacy and if 
applicable, the gamete donation, before adolescence begins.323 If a child receives 
information which require her to review the identity she has already developed, the child 
will discard the identity already developed and will create a new one.324 
Children informed from an early childhood and with the opportunity to grow their 
understanding as they mature, are most likely to manage the information well.325 This is 
because they have a story; a narrative to make sense of their own story.326 It is best to think 
of disclosure not as a single event but as an on-going conversation with opportunities to fine 
tune and build.327 Therefore, disclosure should be done over a period of time and not a once 
off informational session. Children need to be informed over time about the origins and 
circumstances of birth so that it creates an open dialogue between parent and child. 
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4.6 Parents’ and Donors’ Right to Privacy  
 
An issue to consider is whether the child’s right to identifying information about the donor 
negatively affects the privacy rights of the parents and the donor. If the duty to tell donor- 
conceived children the circumstances surrounding their conception is left entirely to the 
parents, then it can be argued that it is the parent’s right to privacy, rather than the child’s 
right to know, that is considered paramount. However, it is suggested that the Department 
of Social Development also be tasked to follow up on the well-being of children born via 
surrogacy and to ensure that parents have started the process of disclosure. 328 Similarly, 
the privacy rights of donors could be threatened by a policy of non- anonymous gamete 
donation.  It is recommended that donors should give informed consent to the donation and 
be aware of the future risk that, the resultant child could seek to identify them. If they do 
not wish to contribute their gametes, it is their own choice not to do so.329  
 
One major problem with a programme of non-anonymous gamete donation is that it could 
cause a decline in the numbers of people willing to donate their gametes, an argument 
routinely raised against establishing such a policy.330  However, two counter arguments 
prevail against this assertion. In 2005, legislation in the UK banned anonymous donation and 
allowed for disclosure of identifiable information to donor-conceived children once they 
turned 18 years of age.331 A later study of past UK gamete donors’ views on how a policy of 
non-anonymous gamete donation would affect their future donation did not firmly validate 
that the new policy would cause a decline in gamete donation.332  It is also unclear that the 
decline in donations in countries that have recently removed gamete donor anonymity (i.e., 
countries such as the UK, New Zealand, and the Netherlands) is solely due to this change in 
policy.333   
 
Secondly, if non-anonymous donation is the ethically right way of organising gamete 
donation, then the low donor numbers is the price that has to be paid for an ethically sound 
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system. 334 It should be noted that children conceived by means of assisted reproductive 
technologies in whatever form are the only group of children who are legally prevented 
from knowing their biological parentage. Donor offspring should not be the only group of 
people legally precluded from finding out identifying information about their biological 
parentage. 335 
 
Children born through surrogacy and anonymous donation are at risk of extreme social 
challenges. In most cases, they are unable to trace or preserve their genetic identities. There 
is no legislation that offers any protection, or enforcement mechanisms in South Africa for a 
donor- conceived child to obtain identifiable information regarding her genetic origins or 
parents. 
 
In the context of ART, the state tends to focus on the needs and desires of parents to create 
children and fails to consider its duties, which flow directly to those children.336 Society is  
slowly moving into an era where that needs to change.  Even when children have parents 
with good intentions, such parent’s decision-making must be assisted by a state 
government that encourages the free-flow of policies that promote children‘s rights.337  
 
4.7 Enforcement 
 
It is the recommendation of this research paper that the right to identity can only be 
properly realised by the enforcement of this right. Therefore, in order to access his identity 
rights, the child has a right to know the details of her origins.  She is therefore entitled to 
the information regarding the circumstances of her birth as the SALRC found based on  
the interpretation of the arguments raised by Cowden.338 Such information needs to be 
disclosed by a parent or parents before the age of 10.339 This will enable a child to process 
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the information needed to form a particular identity. Furthermore, if a parent relays this 
information, the child may not have negative connotations regarding the information. The 
child will trust and readily accept the information given by a parent. Enforcement of 
disclosure should be overseen by the Department of Social Services who has professional 
social workers who can monitor and assess the child. They can also ensure that the parents 
do disclose.  
 
Children should have access to identifiable information of the donor. To assist the child to 
have access to identifiable information, a guardian ad litem should be appointed. This 
person will then assist the child to access the records kept of donors or surrogate. However 
in order to balance the privacy rights of the donor and the rights of the child, should the 
child wish to make contact, consent should be obtained from the donor first. The same rule 
should apply if the donor-conceived child wishes to contact the surrogate mother. During 
the period of disclosure, the child should be given the option of undergoing counselling if 
the child finds the information difficult to digest. 
 
4.8 Legislative recommendations 
 
This research paper recommends the following amendments to the existing regulatory 
scheme of South Africa, which this paper dealt with. 
 
4.8.1 Children’s Act 
 
The recommendation of the AD Hoc Committee was that a statutory body should be 
constituted to operate as the panel to screen parties wishing to enter into a surrogacy 
agreement.340 This recommendation should be implemented. The recommendations or 
concerns of the panel should accompany the high court application to have the surrogacy 
agreement confirmed. The right to know biological origins and the right to be told about the 
biological origins should also be inserted in the Children’s Act. The conditions of disclosure, 
the age of the child, as well as the relevant professional bodies who must assist during this 
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time must be stipulated. This will require that section 41 and section 302 of the Children’s 
Act be amended. This research paper recommends that these sections only be amended to 
state that upon application by the child with the assistance of the guardian ad litem, or 
parents, the identity of the gamete donor and or surrogate be disclosed to the child. If the 
child wishes to initiate contact with the gamete donor or surrogate, the child should be 
counselled in the event the gamete donor or surrogate declines the invitation. 
 
4.8.2 National Health Act read with the Regulations Relating to the Artificial Fertilisation 
of Persons 
 
This paper recommends that a competent person as defined be required to inform any 
gamete donor or surrogate the fact that their identity will be revealed to the donor-
conceived child, upon receipt of such an application to the central data bank. The 
competent person must also explain the possibility that such a child may wish to make 
contact. Further that anonymous gamete donation and surrogacy is no longer possible, 
however that the identifying information will only be disclosed to the donor- conceived 
child. It is not necessary to amend Regulation 19 of the NHA does as it provides for the 
situation where a law dictates the identity of the donor to be disclosed. Regulation 21 needs 
to be amended to allow for the disclosure of the identity of the gamete donor and 
surrogate, upon application of the donor-conceived child. This disclosure would therefore 
not constitute a criminal offence. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
The right to identity is an integral part of the child’s identity formation. This identity right 
encapsulates the component of the right to know your biological origins. It is evident that 
the right to biological origins can only be fully realised if a legal mechanism exists to enforce 
this right. In South Africa, the mechanism best used is the Children’s Act. However, the child 
cannot utilise the legal mechanism if the reason for its existence is not revealed. Therefore, 
the child of necessity also has a legal right to be told about the circumstances regarding her 
conception. 
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This research paper has shown the donor-conceived child indeed has a legal right to know 
her biological origins. This right can be enforced and furthermore the time has come for 
South Africa to amend its gamete donation and surrogacy laws.341 Failure to do so would be 
contradictory to the child’s best interest and the judgment of the AB case. 
 
The word count for this research paper: 19860 
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